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After introducing the new field of cultural evolution, we review a growing body of empirical evidence 
suggesting that culture shapes what people attend to, perceive and remember as well as how they 
think, feel and reason. Focusing on perception, spatial navigation, mentalizing, thinking styles, reasoning 
(epistemic norms) and language, we discuss not only important variation in these domains, but 
emphasize that most researchers (including philosophers) and research participants are psychologically 
peculiar within a global and historical context. This rising tide of evidence recommends caution in relying 
on one’s intuitions or even in generalizing from reliable psychological findings to the species, Homo 
sapiens. Our evolutionary approach suggests that humans have evolved a suite of reliably developing 
cognitive abilities that adapt our minds, information-processing abilities and emotions ontogenetically 
to the diverse culturally-constructed worlds we confront.       
   
 






   
 
   
 
How much does culture shape people’s brains and cognition? Does culture shape ‘core’ or ‘basic’ 
aspects of our attention, perception, thought, memory, reasoning, motivations, mentalizing abilities, 
decision heuristics/biases or moral intuitions? Does culture influence our epistemological inclinations 
such as what constitutes a good argument or solid evidence? Given that over 90% of all research in the 
experimental social sciences is done with samples drawn from societies that are Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich and Democratic (WEIRD), how appropriate is the pervasive, though often implicit, 
assumption that such findings can be generalized to the species (Henrich et al., 2010)? In this paper, 
we’ll address these questions by reviewing the available research in psychology, cognitive science, 
cultural evolution, economics and allied fields. However, to properly understand how and why culture 
can shape our minds so profoundly, we begin with a brief introduction to the interdisciplinary field of 
cultural evolution.   
A cultural species 
Unlike other animals, humans have evolved genetically to rely heavily on acquiring a vast body of tools, 
techniques, heuristics, biases, motivations, emotions and know-how from other members of our social 
groups (Boyd, 2017; Henrich, 2016; Laland, 2017). To survive, even as hunter-gatherers living in the 
kinds of environments in which we genetically evolved, our species depend on a broad body of 
accumulated cultural know-how to find food, make shelters and care for infants. Our reliance on the 
products of this cumulative learning process—like fire, cooking, cutting tools and ecological 
knowledge—extends well back into our evolutionary history, at least hundreds of thousands of years, 
but probably over a million years. Over this period, our brains, along with their capacity to acquire, 
store, organize and retransmit cultural information, expanded dramatically, driven by a spiraling 
accumulation of adaptive practices and technology generated by cultural evolution (Muthukrishna, 
Doebeli, et al., 2018; Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2016; Street et al., 2017).   
To lay a foundation for understanding culture, researchers in the emerging field of cultural evolution 
begin by asking how natural selection might have shaped our genes to improve the effectiveness of our 
learning. For example, how might natural selection influence the who, what and when of cultural 
learning, to more effectively select the most adaptive aspects of other people’s behavior, strategies, 
motivations, beliefs and heuristics (Laland, 2004; Rendell et al., 2011). Testing predictions derived from 
this evolutionary approach to cultural transmission, a large body of evidence shows that learners rely on 
cues related to prestige, success, skill, ethnicity, sex and age when deciding ‘who’ to learn from (Chudek 
et al., 2013; Harris & Corriveau, 2011), as well as cues that mark ‘what’ to learn and ‘when’ to use social 
learning over personal intuitions or direct experience (Barrett & Broesch, 2012; Morgan & Laland, 2012; 
Muthukrishna et al., 2016). Most important for our purposes here, laboratory studies have already 
shown how adults, children and often even infants culturally acquire a number of different aspects of 
their psychology, including decision-making heuristics (Rosenthal & Zimmerman, 1978), fairness 
preferences (Blake et al., 2016; Salali et al., 2015), altruistic preferences (Rushton, 1975), perceptual 
biases (e.g., overconfidence (Cheng et al., 2020)), goals (Hamlin et al., 2008, 2009) and food tastes 
(Birch, 1987). It’s well established that many features of reasoning, motivation, affect, judgment and 
decision-making can be readily culturally transmitted (Bandura, 1977; Henrich, 2020).   
This work has provided both the theoretical and empirical micro-foundations for building mathematical 
models of cultural evolution and culture-gene coevolution. These models, by aggregating the impacts of 
individual-level learning processes across a population, provide a bottom-up approach to explaining 
   
 
   
 
sociological phenomena like large-scale cooperation (Boyd et al., 2010, 2011; Henrich & Henrich, 2007), 
social norms (Chudek & Henrich, 2010), social stratification (Henrich & Boyd, 2008), ethnic groups 
(McElreath et al., 2003), cultures of honor (McElreath, 2003), status (J. Henrich et al., 2015; J. Henrich & 
Gil-White, 2001), divination (Hong & Henrich, forthcoming), shamanism (Singh, 2018a), witchcraft 
(Singh, 2018b),  and innovation (Henrich, 2009, 2004; Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2016). Culture, by this 
account, represents information stored in people’s heads that got there via cultural learning or direct 
experience induced by various cultural products, like norms, technologies, languages or institutions.  
Perhaps most important for our discussion here, researchers in this field argue that our large brains, 
which evolved genetically in a world shaped by norms, institutions, technologies and languages, embody 
an information-processing plasticity that permits them to adapt ontogenetically and over cultural 
evolutionary time to the affordances, constraints and incentives created by the culturally-constructed 
worlds we have long inhabited. That is, we have evolved genetically to have a degree of developmental 
plasticity (Henrich, 2016; Herculano-Houzel, 2019; Laland, 2017). This cognitive and neurological 
flexibility, including our late myelinization, is a genetic adaptation to confronting a culturally-constructed 
world (Gómez-Robles et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2012; Sherwood et al., 2012; Sherwood & Gómez-Robles, 
2017). We’ve evolved to be self-programmable to a degree not found in other species. 
This evolutionary approach to humans has implications that may be of interest to philosophers: 
1. It dissolves the epistemologically troubling ‘nature versus nurture’ dichotomy, which has often 
pitted ‘evolutionary’ or ‘biological’ explanations against those based on ‘culture’ or ‘learning’. By 
approaching our capacities for learning as adaptations, which are ultimately traceable to the 
operation of natural selection, it seats all explanations within an evolutionary framework. 
Within this framework, explanations will vary in their downstream (more proximate) 
mechanisms. ‘Cultural explanations’ are then simply those that specify a substantial role for 
social learning in a causal chain that accounts for particular phenotypic distributions.  
2. From this perspective, culture is part of our biology in two distinct ways: First, many aspects of 
our genetically evolved physiology, anatomy and cognition have been shaped by selective forces 
traceable to cultural evolution. As the examples below will make clear, one cannot study either 
human physiology or our cognitive architecture without considering culture-driven genetic 
evolution. Second, culture shapes our biology—including our brains and anatomy—through 
non-genetic inheritance processes—so, even putting aside culture-gene coevolution, aspects of 
our biology evolve culturally. The means that our brains and psychology have been evolving 
culturally over historical time (Muthukrishna et al., 2021).   
3. Cultural evolutions stands alongside natural selection acting on genes as a non-conscious and 
unintentional process capable of generating adaptive or functional complexity (J. Henrich, 
2016).   
Unfortunately, dualistic assumptions about minds versus bodies/brains and nature versus 
nurture/learning still pervade much thinking in many parts of the social sciences and humanities. To 
address this, we begin our review by looking at how culture shapes (non-genetically) human bodies, 
literally from head to toe. As you’ll see, culture alters our anatomy and physiology, leading medical 
researchers focused on WEIRD people to make incorrect inferences about basic aspects of human 
psychology, health, aging and disease. If culture can alter our physiology and anatomy, do we really 
believe it will leave our reasoning and judgment unaffected? Next, we focus on how culture influences 
   
 
   
 
people’s sensory abilities, perceptions, spatial cognition and mentalizing. Each of these represents a 
fundamental feature of our species that has long been crucial to our survival. Yet, key aspects in these 
domains vary across populations in important ways. Down shifting into the domain of greater interest to 
philosophers, we review the research on thinking styles, reasoning, epistemic norms and judgement. 
Here, we show that not only do these vary among populations, but that WEIRD participants anchor the 
extreme ends of global distributions. We close our empirical review with some concerns about scholars’ 
overreliance on intuitions and insights rooted in the use of English. English is peculiar along many 
important dimensions and may be quite unrepresentative of most spoken languages over human 
history.   
Culture shapes humans in profound ways 
Scholars often have the intuition that culture can only shape superficial aspects of our minds; or worse, 
they persist in applying an outdated digital computer metaphor that incorrectly partitions brains and 
minds into ‘hardware,’ supposedly studied by neuroscientists and psychologists, and ‘software,’ 
allegedly studied by anthropologists and sociologists. This ill-fit metaphor leads them to infer there’s 
some hermetically sealed set of cognitive hardware that can’t be influenced by culture.  
Our first step in addressing such misconceptions is to illustrate how culture shapes features of human 
anatomy and physiology, including features that have clearly been the target of natural selection—i.e., 
our genetic adaptations. We’ll further show how medical researchers, physiologists and anatomists have 
made errors in understanding our species’ bodies as a consequence of their readiness to generalize from 
studies of people from societies that are Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic 
(WEIRD) to Homo sapiens. Reliance on these peculiar populations, who grow up in environments 
without evolutionary precedence, have led to confusions regarding the nature of “human” body 
temperature, running form, hormonal life cycles (e.g., testosterone), foot mechanics, and the 
functioning of our immune systems. Overly enthusiastic generalizations from WEIRD samples have led 
medical researchers to incorrectly assume that many chronic diseases were the result of aging rather 
than a specific response to life in particular environments.  
Let’s start at the bottom. When paleoanthropologists first started to compare the fossilized feet and 
footprints of Australopithecines to “modern” humans they declared that the Australopiths had 
“primitive feet,” noting for example their high arches. However, decades later, it turned out that the 
unusual features of Australopith feet could be found in contemporary human populations once 
researchers stopped focusing on people who grew up wearing hard soled shoes (Tuttle et al., 1990, 
1991). Compared to most societies that have ever existed, habitually-shod populations, especially those 
who don snug-fitting, hard soled shoes, have unusual feet, including fallen arches. WEIRD people even 
put shoes on their children! 
Is the foot a peculiar exception? Well, when researchers began to study ‘the human running form,’ they 
also got the wrong answer. The reason is that they studied runners who had adapted their form to 
wearing cushioned running shoes—essentially strapping pillows to their feet. Equipped with such 
cushions, runners tend to land on their heels. By contrast, populations who habitually run barefoot, or in 
any sort of minimalist footwear, develop a running style in which they land on their mid- or forefoot. 
Analyses of the biomechanics of habitually barefoot runners suggest that humans evolved genetically to 
run long-distances, and specifically to absorb shocks via a mid or fore-foot strike (where the calf muscle 
   
 
   
 
acts as a shock absorber), not a heel strike. Studying runners who grew up in a world with cushioned 
running shoes (1975 to 2020?) suggested that people didn’t evolve to run because the magnitude of the 
pounding created by chronic heel strikes leads to knee problems, plantar fasciitis and other issues 
(Bramble & Lieberman, 2004; Lieberman, 2012). Of course, recognizing the potential role played by 
running shoes is relatively easy compared to recognizing all of the more subtle norms, technologies and 
aspects of language that shape our thinking, feeling and intuitions in a manner analogous to how 
sneakers distorted our running form.  
Culture also shapes our hormones—specifically men’s testosterone (T) changes over the life course. Like 
many bird species (and lizards), testosterone levels in males rise during mate-seeking, mating and status 
competition, but then decline after monogamous pair-bonding and with caring of offspring (Hooven, 
2021). Laboratory evidence has linked testosterone to status seeking and zero-sum thinking, which often 
results in impatience, risk-taking, mistrust and reduced responsiveness to learning from pain. The 
difference between birds and humans is—of course—that human mating and pair-bonding is heavily 
regulated by norms and institutions, like marriage. Societies vary in their marriage institutions, but from 
a global and historical perspective, modern monogamous marriage is quite peculiar. Most societies have 
permitted high status men to marry polygynously, and often placed few or no constraints on their sexual 
behavior. The available evidence suggests that men’s relative testosterone levels over their life course 
depends on the marriage and child-care norms they confront. In normatively monogamous societies, 
where fathers are expected to provide some childcare, men’s T-levels drop when they marry and again 
when their first child arrives. This decline often continues as they age, sometimes resulting in chronically 
“low-T”, a recognized clinical condition. By contrast, there’s little indication that men’s T-levels drop 
after marriage in polygynous societies (after all, they remain on the marriage and mating market) or 
after children arrive (since norms in such societies rarely encourage fatherly infant care). Moreover, any 
age-related declines in men’s relative T-levels are mild compared to the more dramatic drops common 
in WEIRD societies. Once again, the medical establishment erred in thinking that the large T-level 
declines they observed in WEIRD men were the inevitable products of aging (Henrich, 2020; Henrich et 
al., 2012). It turns out, there’s an interaction between aging and marriage norms that one entirely 
misses by studying WEIRD people, with their historically peculiar marriage system and consequent 
cultural endocrinology.   
What’s the internal temperature of the human body? In 1851, the German physician Carl Reinhold 
Wunderlich measured the temperature of 25,000 patients and set the modern standard for body 
temperature at 37 C or 98.6 F. But, is this measurement a feature of human bodies?  
Surprisingly, no. It turns out that mean body temperature in the U.S. has been declining by roughly 0.3 
degrees per decade since the mid-19th century (Protsiv et al., 2020). Similarly, among the Tsimane, who 
rely on slash-and-burn agriculture and hunting for their subsistence in the Bolivian rainforest, mean 
body temperature has been declining by 0.5 degrees per decade since 2000. Why?  
The answer remains a bit of a mystery, but part of the decline is likely due to a reduction in parasite 
loads that most humans have routinely carried until very recently (Gurven et al., 2020). If you study 
WEIRD people, you even get “human” body temperature wrong. Our body temperature depends, at 
least in part, on our epidemiological contexts. Clean water, antibiotics, vaccinations and other 
unidentified factors have left us with low body temperatures, uncharacteristic of those found over our 
species evolutionary history.  
   
 
   
 
The recent and dramatic reductions in the parasite loads carried by many human populations—a pattern 
first appearing in WEIRD people—has misled researchers in another way. Medical science has long taken 
chronic inflammation to be a cause of heart disease. However, these links only appear in populations 
with very low parasite loads. That is, in populations with high parasite loads, chronic inflammation is not 
associated with heart disease (Gurven et al., 2009; Gurven et al., 2016; Gurven & Lieberman, 2020). A 
leading explanation suggests that natural selection may have depended on the reliable presence of 
helminths, a type of parasite, in our bodies as a means to manage the negative impact of chronic 
inflammation. Once cumulative cultural evolution devised ways to eliminate helminths from our bodies, 
chronic inflammation became a new factor contributing to rising rates of heart disease. The lesson here 
is that studying people living in helminth-free environments led to an impaired understanding of the 
nature and evolution of heart disease. 
Arriving at our heads, this epidemiological process may explain another pattern: the appearance of 
facial acne varies from zero percent in some small-scale societies up to 95% in urban WEIRD societies 
(Campbell & Strassmann, 2016). Such data hint that acne was likely rare over much of our species 
evolutionary history and suggest that the science of acne that has developed by studying WEIRD people 
is missing some major risk factors—which are homogenous across WEIRD societies. Acne is cultural.  
Natural selection has substantially shaped our bite and teeth relative to other primates (Lieberman, 
2011), so is this a reliably developing feature of our anatomy? Today, most contemporary humans 
display a particular bite configuration – the upper teeth are projected in front of the lower teeth during 
occlusion (‘overbite’) spanning a small acute angle in relation to them (‘overjet’). This configuration was 
(and still is) deemed as the normal, healthy bite, emerging early in life and accompanying individuals 
throughout adulthood (Heikinheimo et al., 2012; Tibana et al., 2004). Many people today also need 
braces for an orderly smile (Lieberman, 2013). However, researchers studying foraging populations have 
argued that the type of bite that has characterized most of our species’ history has neither overbite nor 
overjet, and is instead defined by the full occlusion of the upper and lower teeth, creating an edge-to-
edge bite (Begg, 1954). This dental pattern likely arose from a developmental response to heavy wear 
diets, which progressively shaped the bite and the orofacial features of individuals from overbite and 
overjet in pre-adolescent individuals to an edge-to-edge bite in adults. This is the ‘normal development’ 
from an evolutionary perspective.  
This seemingly unremarkable change in people’s bite configuration had substantial consequences. First, 
the shift likely led to observable changes in the speech sounds present in the world’s languages (Blasi et 
al., 2019), giving rise to labiodentals like ‘f’ and ‘v’ sounds. If you are a linguist, you can’t get human 
phoneme variation correct without understanding how technology shapes the ontogeny of the human 
bite and how that influences the sounds found in languages. Second, the close alignment of teeth in this 
edge-to-edge configuration likely inhibited the emergence of cavities and other periodontal diseases 
compared to contemporary configurations (Kaifu et al., 2003). Chewing tough food and working 
materials like leather over childhood may also have encouraged the straighter and more uniform spread 
of teeth, thus avoiding the situation that prompts the use of braces today. Thus, by favoring softer foods 
and technologies capable of replacing the tasks once done with our teeth, cultural evolution first 
produced the jumbled smiles and dental problems found in many agricultural populations (Lieberman, 
2013). Now, cultural evolution is trying to fix the problem it created with braces and dentists. Thus, the 
‘human’ bite has continued to evolve culturally over history as the task demands on our teeth and jaws 
have changed. 
   
 
   
 
Sensory abilities and perception  
It’s a short step from the effects of culture on our anatomy and physiology to its impact on our senses 
and perceptions. Perhaps the oldest lines of research on this come from studying how culture influences 
myopia, effectively changing people’s visual acuity. Among hunter-gatherer populations, who live in the 
kinds of environments that dominated most of our evolutionary history, myopia is almost non-existent 
(Cordain et al., 2002). In contrast, today in the industrialized world, nearly 25% of the population is 
myopic, and need glasses to correct their vision. Debates persist on the precise causes of this, but key 
influences include urban environments, time spent indoors and reading during childhood. So, if you 
study “human visual acuity” by focusing on WEIRD people, you might infer that “it’s genetic” (because 
genetic variation does contribute). However, this would be misleading since myopia is now thought to 
be entirely a gene-environment interaction—if you grow up as a forager, no genes make you more 
susceptible to myopia because the relevant cultural practices aren’t found in these populations. These 
‘myopia genes’ only matter at all in recent environments. Thus, studying WEIRD people means you get 
human visual acuity wrong and even your inferences about the role of genes could be misleading. 
Similarly, a venerable line of research going back to 1901 by W.H.R. Rivers suggests that our 
susceptibility to various visual illusions also varies across societies (Berry, 1968; Bremner et al., 2016; 
Jahoda, 1966; Rivers, 1901; Segall et al., 1963, 1966). This includes some of the most common illusions, 
such as the Horizontal-Vertical, Sander-parallelogram and the Ebbinghaus illusions as well as the famous 
Mueller-Lyer Illusion. This cross-cultural variation is consistent with older developmental data showing 
that our susceptibility to particular illusions often changes gradually over our lives (Henrich, 2008) and 
more recent evidence suggesting that illusions are influenced by how our minds calibrate to the 
statistical patterns found in our visual environments as they convert the 2-D images projected onto our 
retinas to 3-D representations (Howe & Purves, 2005).  
Curiously, this well-established population-level variation has been ignored in philosophical debates: 
long after substantial evidence was available, the Mueller-Lyer Illusion was claimed to be a “cognitively 
impenetrable” creation of the human mind by Jerry Fodor in his debates about modularity with the 
Churchlands (McCauley & Henrich, 2006). Yet, research done in the 1960s had already revealed 
substantial variation in the strength of the Mueller-Lyer illusion, with WEIRD people showing the 
greatest susceptibility and Kalahari hunter-gatherers not seeing the illusion at all.1 
WEIRD intellectuals have long argued that olfaction is the least important of the five senses, and this has 
been the standard view in psychology and even in anthropology. Yet, this may be a WEIRD bias that we 
culturally inherited from our farming forebearers. Recent work among both forager-horticulturalists in 
Bolivia and hunter-gatherers in Malaysia suggests that these populations are superior at identifying 
scents and possess a richer vocabulary that includes an array of basic (abstract) scent terms (Majid & 
Kruspe, 2018; Sorokowska et al., 2013). This is striking because some WEIRD intellectuals have 
suggested that it’s impossible to speak abstractly about scents (Majid & Burenhult, 2014), presumably 
because their languages and cultural routines didn’t habituate and automate the application of such 
concepts (more on this below). While philosophers have recognized some of this important work on 
olfaction (Barwich, 2020), it’s less clear that the field has fully digested the implications of relying on 
WEIRD neuroscience (Han et al., 2013; Kitayama et al., 2017, 2019). 
 
   
 




Going well back into our evolutionary history, humans have confronted the need to think about space in 
a variety of ways. Like other animals, human spatial navigation and memory present crucial cognitive 
challenges that have been linked to a variety of cognitive abilities, and human foragers have long 
needed to navigate through space and remember the details of their home ranges to avoid predation, 
find mates, and remember the location of objects or past events (Milton, 1988; Powell & Mitchell, 
2012). Some of the most commonly studied spatial cognitive abilities include (1) spatial memory and 
navigation (which allows us to store and retrieve information about our surroundings, remember where 
objects are located, or where an event took place), (2) spatial perspective-taking (how objects in the 
environment are oriented in relation to another), and (3) mental rotation (the ability to imagine how an 
object that has been seen from one perspective would look if it were rotated in space or viewed from 
the new perspective). Decades of research have explored the degree to which these cognitive features 
are products of innately available representations (R. F. Wang & Spelke, 2002), how basic spatial 
processes interact with the symbolic world (Stokes, 2018), and what the role of individual differences is 
(Hegarty & Waller, 2005; Proulx et al., 2016).  
Though spatial reasoning and associated cognitive abilities, such as spatial memory and mentalizing, 
improve throughout children’s development (Hart & Moore, 1973; Vasilyeva & Lourenco, 2012), there 
remain substantial performance gaps within and across populations that remain largely unexplained. For 
example, in an investigation of navigational ability between two WEIRD populations in Padua, Italy and 
Salt Lake City, Utah, USA, Barhorst-Cates et al. (2021), found that adults in Padua, who have 
substantially lower pointing error within their own city when compared to Utahans, were no more 
accurate at pointing to familiar distant targets outside their cities >10 km away than participants in Utah 
(~37° error).  
Compare these WEIRD populations to traditional societies in Africa and Amazonia. In Amazonia, forager-
horticulturalists—the Tsimane—in Bolivia were asked to point from their home village to distant 
communities over 60 km away that are only accessible by canoe, traveling along a sinuous Amazonian 
tributary. Here, Tsimane adults average just 20 degrees of error (Davis et al., in press) and children 
average only ~40° pointing error (Davis & Cashdan, 2019). On the other side of the globe, in the arid 
regions of Nambia, Twa pastoralist-forager children (M = 11.6 years old, SD = 3.4 years) point to distant 
locations up to 90km away with considerable accuracy, averaging only 20° error (Davis et al., 2021), 
which is on par with adults in their communities and Tsimane adults, but is twice as accurate as the 
navigationally-challenged adults sampled in Padua and Salt Lake.  
Though considerable prior work has aimed to identify and relate individual differences, surprisingly little 
work has focused on the characteristics of a navigator's home environment, as well as on the cultural 
and daily navigational requirements, as an explanation for why individual differences may be observed. 
However, a few classic studies, along with a wide range of recent evidence from the Spatial Cognition 
and Navigation (SCAN) lab have demonstrated how local environments, economic demands and 
particular ecologies, and social norms and cultural institutions shape human’s spatial cognitive abilities 
(Barhorst-Cates et al., 2021; Cashdan et al., 2016; Crittenden et al., 2021; Davis & Cashdan, 2019).  First, 
in the Padua and Salt Lake City study, Barhorst-Cates et al. (2021) found through interviews focused on 
daily activities and city mapping that the greatest influence on navigation strategies and accuracy 
   
 
   
 
between the two WEIRD populations was home environmental experiences. Padua adults, who live in a 
winding city filled with bridged moats and arcaded streets, were twice as accurate when pointing to 
within city targets when compared to Americans in Salt Lake City, who live on a metropolitan grid with 
few proximal cues but some distinct distal geological markers. The study further suggests that mode of 
travel and street network entropy may further improve or inhibit the development of navigational skills. 
This conclusion is further supported among the Tsimane and Twa. Among the Tsimane, labor demands 
require navigating dense tropical canopies with frequent cloud coverage that obscures distal cues. 
Though there are ecological risks, children are given considerable latitude to explore without adult 
supervision and are expected to contribute to household labor (Davis & Cashdan, 2019). Likewise, 
among the Twa, men and boys have historically traveled long distances to find grazing lands and water 
for their herds while women foraged nearby for medicinal and edible plants.  
Similar links between ecology, social norms, and navigational ability have been identified in other 
studies among non-WEIRD children. For example, among the Mbendjele BaYaka in the Republic of 
Congo, children spend considerable time in work and play away from home beginning at an early age 
(Lew-Levy et al., 2020), and on a similar pointing task their navigational error was found to be as low as 
7° (Jang et al., 2019). Likewise, in a seminal study among Alaskan school children (Kleinfeld, 1971), 
children of native Alaskan descent demonstrated far greater visual spatial memory than their European-
descent peers. Building on earlier findings from Berry (1966), Kleinfeld attributed the differences in the 
two populations to the freedom to explore granted to children in Inuit populations. While children from 
both the Tsimane of Bolivia and Twa of Namibia performed well on tasks of spatial memory and 
navigation, they also showed highly developed spatial perspective taking skills, with only around 66° 
error when asked to imagine that they were in a known location far way and navigate from that 
mentalized location to a third target location. Compared to the Tsimane and Twe, studies in WEIRD 
populations suggest lower overall performance on spatial perspective taking (Vander Heyden et al., 
2017), as well as large intra-population differences, which may in part be culturally influenced (Tarampi 
et al., 2016). 
Given the role that ecology and socialization practices play on navigational and pointing ability, it is 
critical to reassess how some previously assumed genetic differences may be amplified by, or even the 
product of, social norms or cultural institutions. Sex differences have long been a focus of spatial 
cognitive research in WEIRD populations (Linn & Petersen, 1985; Voyer et al., 1995). Many studies 
report that men (compared to women) learn spatial environments faster and can recall routes with 
fewer errors (Coluccia & Louse, 2004; Galea & Kimura, 1993). Overall, sex differences in mental rotation 
remains among the most widely studied spatial skills that favor men (Voyer et al., 1995). And, although 
there is still some debate about the age that differences in spatial abilities are first observed; most 
WEIRD studies suggest that they emerge during middle childhood, around 9 or 10 years old (Neuburger 
et al., 2011). Given the consistency of these observed differences, evolutionary hypotheses have been 
proposed to explain why biological sex differences in spatial ability might exist (Geary, 2010). These 
hypotheses focus on the benefits males gain from meeting various navigational challenges, including 
mate seeking (Gaulin et al., 1990; Geary, 1995; Jones et al., 2003) or the emergence of the sexual 
division of labor in humans during the Pleistocene (Silverman et al., 2007).  
Consistent with these arguments, it has been observed in both WEIRD societies (Hart, 1979; Matthews, 
1987) and small-scale societies (Whiting & Edwards, 1992) that children first demonstrate significant sex 
differences in range size during middle childhood, when they begin participating in sex specific tasks and 
   
 
   
 
start spending more time with same-sex peers. These differences are argued to increase after 
adolescence, when boys enter their mate seeking years (Miner et al., 2014). For example, Vashro and 
colleagues (2016; 2015) found that among Twa pastoralists the average daily range size for Twa men 
was greater than that of Twa women. They also demonstrated that men had (1) lower average error on 
a navigational pointing task compared to women and (2) greater accuracy on a mental rotation task. 
Supporting an evolutionary account, Twa men with larger ranges were also found to have fathered more 
children by more women—they had higher fitness.  
However, sex differences in navigational cognition don’t always emerge. In East Africa, sex differences in 
navigational abilities were not found among participants still living a traditional foraging lifestyle; 
instead, they only arose among participants from communities located closer to the market towns, 
where people tended to be less mobile and had smaller range sizes (Cashdan et al., 2012). Likewise, 
among Tsimane adults, where men and women both travel far for food, sex differences in navigational 
ability were not observed (Trumble et al., 2015). Instead, Tsimane’s daily mobility, wayfinding/pointing 
error, and mental rotation were related to differences in age, participation in the wage labor market and 
more years of formal education (Davis et al., in press). This raises questions about the role mobility 
patterns, market exposure, and formal schooling play in spatial cognitive development.  
Illustrating the power of institutions to have unintended cognitive consequences, consider the impact of 
boarding schools for the Twa, where sex differences have been consistently observed among adult men 
and women (as mentioned above). When both boys and girls began traveling on foot weekly to 
government funded boarding schools, they demonstrated precocious navigational skills and no sex 
differences with increased mobility. Notably, boys and girls outperformed most adult women who had 
not had access to formal schooling growing up and whose mobility has been traditionally constrained by 
childcare and domestic work close to camp (Davis et al., 2021). In contrast, among tropical forager-
horticulturalists, where mobility patterns vary by age but not gender, children who spent more time 
attending local village schools traveled less than their peers and performed worse on navigational tasks 
(Davis & Cashdan, 2019), though they were still precocious compared to children in WEIRD societies. 
Additionally, children in both populations showed higher performance on tasks of mental rotation (the 
ability to imagine what an object would look like if it were rotated about its axis) with more formal 
schooling. Children even outperformed their parents and other adults in their community with less 
schooling as early as 7 years old (Davis et al., in press).  Altogether, this cross-cultural evidence suggests 
that early childhood environments, including the cultural institutions they’re exposed to, play a crucial 
role in the development of spatial cognitive abilities. Broadly, schooling improves some cognitive 
abilities while eroding others. 
The upshot is that a narrow focus on WEIRD participants has resulted in a distorted picture of our 
species’ navigational cognition that can be seen in adult cognitive phenotypes, developmental patterns 
and apparent sex differences. An inclination to generalize from WEIRD people to “humans” persists 
among developmental psychologists and cognitive scientists despite a long history of such studies, 
stretching back into the 1960s.  
Mentalizing 
Theory of mind– the ability to mentalize, or infer others’ beliefs, intentions, and desires– is likely an 
important feature of our species’ evolved psychology. Many researchers have suggested that 
sophisticated mentalizing abilities provided a selective advantage to individuals living in large social 
   
 
   
 
groups, either by facilitating success in competitive relationships or by sharpening their cultural learning 
abilities. Supporting this view, mentalizing abilities emerge early in development across diverse 
populations (Baillargeon et al., 2016; Barrett et al., 2013; Callaghan et al., 2005; Hamlin et al., 2008, 
2009; Hamlin, 2013a, 2013b; Robbins et al., 2017).  
However, just because humans everywhere reliably develop mentalizing abilities does not mean that 
they do so to the same extent or in the same contexts. Instead, growing evidence suggests that social 
norms and institutions can shape theory of mind, giving rise to cross-cultural variation in mentalizing 
inclinations. WEIRD people appear to be “hyper-mentalizers”, lying at the extreme end of the global 
spectrum (Barrett et al., 2016; Curtin et al., 2020). Although children everywhere reliably develop theory 
of mind, the trajectory of this development varies across societies. Notably, there is cross-cultural 
variation in the order of acquisition of theory of mind concepts: while WEIRD children tend to 
understand that others can have different beliefs before they understand that others can have different 
knowledge, Chinese and Turkish children show the opposite pattern, potentially reflecting cultural 
differences related to individualism versus collectivism (Selcuk et al., 2018; Wellman et al., 2006). In 
addition, growing evidence suggests that Western-style formal schooling may foster an earlier 
development of theory of mind (Kuntoro et al., 2013; Vinden, 1999, 2002; Wang et al., 2016). For 
example, students at Chinese-style schools in Hong Kong show delays in theory of mind relative to 
children at British-style schools in the same city even after controlling for socioeconomic factors (Wang 
et al., 2016). These findings raise the possibility that Western-style formal schooling may foster an 
emphasis on mentalizing. 
Cross-cultural variation in conceptions of the mind may also shape the extent to which people engage in 
mentalizing across contexts (Willard & McNamara, 2019). Anthropologists have identified six different 
“theories of mind” from across the ethnographic spectrum. Beyond the well-known Western secular 
conception, which situates the mind as an entity separate from, but causally important to, the physical 
world, there are a diversity of non-WEIRD approaches. Other conceptions of mind vary across multiple 
dimensions (Luhrmann et al., 2011, 2021), including 
(1) Porousness: can minds enter other minds? (underpinning phenomena like spirit possession) 
(2) Causality: do intentions play a causal role in the physical world? (underpinning many 
witchcraft and evil eye beliefs)  
(3) Relational access: is it socially acceptable to make inferences about others’ minds?  
Illustrating the role of relational access, anthropologists have documented Opacity of Mind norms—
rooted in the belief that other minds are fundamentally unknowable—in small-scale societies 
throughout the South Pacific and elsewhere (Luhrmann et al., 2011; Robbins & Rumsey, 2008). Where 
Opacity of Mind norms operate, people feel that it is inappropriate to speculate about others’ minds and 
children are actively socialized to deemphasize internal states and focus instead on external behaviors 
(e.g., crying rather than sadness: Luhrmann et al., 2011; Schieffelin, 1990, 2008). Beyond simply 
modulating behavior, these norms shape people’s tendency to engage in theory of mind. For example, 
compared to either Americans or Indo-Fijians (whose ancestors arrived from India as indentured 
servants), indigenous Fijians are less likely to use inferences about a person’s false beliefs to predict 
their future behavior. They also report thinking less about others’ internal mental states– and this 
accounts for the difference in performance on the false-belief task compared to Americans (McNamara 
et al., 2019, 2021).  
   
 
   
 
Of special interest to philosophers, studies have begun to reveal striking cross-cultural variation in one 
specific facet of mentalizing: the tendency to consider intentions and other mental states when making 
moral judgements. If someone took your bag after mistaking it for their own, would you judge their 
action as harshly as if they had purposefully stolen it? If you’re WEIRD, almost certainly not. WEIRD 
people place heavy emphasis on an actor’s intentions, even judging attempted (but unsuccessful) harms 
more harshly than accidental (but actual) ones (Young et al., 2007; Young & Saxe, 2008, 2009). To the 
WEIRD mind, it is intuitive and obvious that intentions should be central– and this is reflected in 
Western legal codes, which trace back to the High Middle Ages (Berman, 1983; Henrich, 2020). 
When we look elsewhere in the world, however, the generalizability of WEIRD people’s laser-like focus 
on mental states comes into question. Using vignettes featuring theft, physical harm, poisoning, and 
food taboo violations, Barrett et al. (2016) uncovered substantial variation in this tendency across a 
diverse sample of 10 societies. Anchoring the extremes, participants from Los Angeles and rural Ukraine 
judged high-intent harms much more severely than low-intent ones, while participants from Namibia 
and Fiji judged them to be equally bad and worthy of punishment (Barrett et al., 2016). Follow-up work 
confirmed that indigenous Fijians place more emphasis on outcomes than intentions when making 
moral judgments (McNamara et al., 2019, 2021). Interestingly, priming Fijians to think about thoughts 
shifts their judgments to be more intention-focused. This suggests that, under normal circumstances, 
Fijians may be less attuned to mental states than Westerners in making moral judgements. Deviations 
from the WEIRD pattern of moral judgement have also turned up in industrialized Asian societies, with 
Japanese participants placing less weight on intentions than US participants (Hamilton & Sanders, 1992).  
Although cross-cultural experimental research on this topic is rare, the ethnographic record suggests 
that a tendency to weigh outcomes over mental states in moral judgment has been widespread. A 
recent, systematic review of ethnographies found that notions of strict liability— where outcome rather 
than intent or motive is the primary factor in determining culpability— and corporate guilt—where guilt 
for crimes depends on being in the same clan or kin group as the perpetrator— appear in societies 
around the globe and across the spectrum of subsistence strategies (Curtin et al., 2020).  
Although more research is needed to understand the sources of variation in attention to mental states 
during moral judgment, recent evidence indicates that kin-based institutions play a role. Researchers 
use the term “kinship intensity” to describe variation in how central kinship is to the formation of 
personal identity and social networks, noting that WEIRD societies have extremely weak kin-based 
institutions (Curtin et al., 2020; Henrich, 2020; Schulz et al., 2019). Reanalyzing Barrett et al.’s (2016) 
cross-cultural data, Curtin et al. (2020) found that as kinship intensity rises, people’s reliance on mental 
states in moral judgment declines. 
Together, this body of research indicates that the WEIRD obsession with intentions when making moral 
judgements is not representative of humans everywhere. On the contrary, WEIRD people may lie on the 
extreme end of this spectrum. Consequently, scholars from WEIRD societies, or even those educated in 
WEIRD institutions, should distrust the generalizability of their intuitions on such matters. From this 
perspective, efforts to define the epistemic conditions of “moral responsibility” in philosophy (Rudy-
Hiller, 2019) look like formalized versions of WEIRD folk psychology. Are many philosophers doing 
cultural philosophy? 
   
 
   
 
Thinking styles  
John Locke famously claimed, without evidence, that reasoning is an innate, universal human faculty 
(Locke, 1690). Yet, at the same time, researchers have also long recognized a vital role for culture in 
shaping thinking and reasoning since at least the dawn of psychology (see Cole, 2003 for a valuable 
historical overview). Notably, the philosopher Wilhelm Wundt (1916), often considered one of the 
fathers of modern psychology, explicitly advocated for two psychologies – one concerning the properties 
of the mind universal to all humans, the other focused on the role of different cultural contexts in 
shaping psychological phenotypes. While Wundt’s original efforts to trace the differences in reasoning 
among populations to the impact of “civilization” reflected the Euro-centric superiority of his era, the 
question of how culture impacts reasoning has persisted.  
More recently, research that began in the 1960s focused on the effects of formal schooling on cognition 
(see Cole, 1990, 2003; Rogoff, 1981 for reviews). This work, which expanded on Luria’s (1976) 
pioneering efforts in the early 20th century, demonstrated that while there were by and large no 
differences in the capacities for reasoning across populations, habitual patterns of thought did vary 
markedly across populations and, particularly, across educational statuses (schooled v. unschooled). For 
instance, unschooled populations are highly unlikely to operate using abstract categories in solving a 
variety of problems, whether in clustering to-be-recalled items by semantic category, identifying which 
items do or do not belong in a set (e.g. not excluding ‘log’ from the set ‘hatchet-log-hammer-saw' on the 
basis of it not being a tool) and learning rules—e.g., if in one task the correct basis of discrimination is by 
color, the next task is likely to also involve color discrimination (Cole, 1971; Sharp et al., 1979). 
Moreover, even the notion of providing a definition for common objects is largely rejected by non-
schooled participants (Luria, 1976). While unschooled populations have been shown to be capable of 
using abstract categories (after some training or scaffolding), the fact that this is a highly counter-
intuitive approach for groups without the peculiar experience of formal (Western) schooling. In other 
words, while many (if not all) of the operations available for reasoning may be universal, what counts as 
a reasonable way of thinking or the best way of thinking varies (Buchtel & Norenzayan, 2008) and these 
differences have important effects not only on how people approach and solve problems but also on 
how they conceptualize the world.  
Beginning in the late 1990s, researchers in psychology and cognitive science have found that—schooling 
aside—culture plays an essential role in how people reason in domains that include ecology (Busch et 
al., 2018), social conflicts (Peng & Nisbett, 1999), causal attributions (Choi et al., 1999; Li et al., 2012), 
stock prediction, categorization (Norenzayan et al., 2002) and moral cognition (Awad et al., 2018; 
Sachdeva et al., 2011). Among these, the most often discussed aspect of cross-cultural variation is 
undoubtedly the holistic versus analytic spectrum. Broadly speaking, this dimension captures a set of 
interrelated perceptual, cognitive, and reasoning differences among populations (Nisbett et al., 2001). 
For reasoning in particular, analytic thinking is formal (rule-based) and abstract whereas holistic thinking 
is relational and experience-based (Nisbett et al., 2001; Scribner, 1975; Scribner & Cole, 1973). Analytical 
thinkers look for categories with necessary and sufficient conditions, and assign properties to individuals 
and objects based on category membership. By contrast, holistic thinkers focus on the relationships 
among individuals or objects, consider background and context, and judge similarity based on family 
resemblance or gestalt relationships. 
   
 
   
 
Figure 1 shows the country-level variation in analytic versus holistic thinking found using the Triad Task 
in online samples from around the world (Henrich, 2020). The Triad Task asked participants to state 
whether a series of targets, usually shown in images, ‘go with’ one of two other options. For example, 
participants might see a ‘rabbit’ and have to say whether it goes with either the ‘dog’ or the ‘carrot.’ 
More analytically inclined thinkers tend to put the mammals together (rabbits and dogs) while more 
holistically inclined people prefer the functional relationship (rabbits eat carrots). The results show 
substantial variation around the world, ranging from about 20% analytical responses among Serbians to 
nearly 80% among the Dutch. In WEIRD countries, a majority of responses favored the analytic option, 
   
 
   
 
while elsewhere, most other populations were holistically inclined. 
 
Figure 1. Variation in the frequency of analytic (versus holistic) responses across 31 populations. Except for the 
Mapuche, all participants responded online to the same Triad Task at yourmorals.org. The Mapuche data was 
collected using a similar triad task in one-on-one interviews. Drawn from Henrich (2020) with thanks to Thomas 
   
 
   
 
Talhelm. The black bars mark the populations most commonly sampled by researchers in the experimental 
behavioral sciences, though sampling is dominated by Americans, Dutch, Canadians and Brits.   
 
Like Locke, and for psychological reasons we’ll explain below, most Western intellectuals implicitly 
assume that their intuitions, motivations, preferences, emotions and ways of thinking generalize across 
all of humanity. But, while this is sometimes the case, we don’t yet have reliable theories that tell us 
when and where such generalizations are safe. Philosophers should proceed with caution. What if many 
aspects of our reasoning abilities and judgments are influenced by cultural evolution? 
Epistemic norms  
Epistemic norms shape what people (1) attend to when seeking out information, (2) count as evidence 
and (3) consider as a persuasive argument (Henderson, 2020; Kauppinen, 2018; Littlejohn & Turri, 2014; 
Tomasello, 2020). Epistemic norms are so-called because they govern not actions or decisions, but the 
identification of relevant information, the weighting of different kinds of evidence, and the evaluation of 
various forms of argument. This influences the formation and updating of beliefs. Some norms apply to 
particular epistemic activities, such as how one ought to make inferences. For example, epistemic norms 
regulate how one should deal with inconsistencies, interrogate the entailments of, and conflict among, 
one’s own beliefs, and update one’s beliefs in light of new observations. Other epistemic norms govern 
more social aspects of information handling (Brady & Fricker, 2016; Goldman & O’Connor, 2019), such 
as how much confidence to have in the testimony of different individuals or in different kinds of people 
based on their social identity and group membership (“respect the wisdom of your elders,” “believe 
women,” or “distrust strangers”). Others prescribe how much to trust the claims made by different 
institutions and their leaders, and how much authority or deference should be given to experts of 
different kinds: e.g., “conservatives should be skeptical of information in the mainstream media,” “trust 
digital natives,” “when it comes to vaccines, physicians and health care professionals know best”). 
In the modern world, Stahl et al (2016) found that some people see reliance on “logic and evidence” in 
the maintenance of beliefs as a moral issue, while others do not. Those norms that govern the more 
social aspects of epistemic activity are perhaps most familiar. Partisan groups often adopt norms that 
recommend placing different levels of trust in various institutions and experts (e.g., The New York Times 
versus Fox News) and have different leaders that they hold in various levels of esteem (e.g., Biden versus 
Trump). Indeed, publicly rejecting or avowing certain beliefs can serve as an important way for 
individuals to visibly display their identity and signal their commitment to a particular group and its 
values. Such performances can serve to solidify one’s standing as a group member and to enhance one’s 
reputation and credibility within it, especially when such displays are costly in some way (Henrich, 2009; 
Kahan et al., 2017; Schaffner & Luks, 2018). Thus, there can be a tension between epistemic norms that 
reliably lead to true beliefs and those that effectively perform important tribal signaling functions 
associated with social identity and group membership 
In 21st century philosophy, tensions between epistemic norms  tends to emerge in the context of 
contemporary political differences (Edenberg & Hannon, 2021; Nguyen, 2020; Raymond & Kelly, 
forthcoming; Rini, 2017), but the cultural evolution of epistemic norms is an ancient problem: epistemic 
norms vary substantially across diverse populations and back into history. Henrich (2020), for example, 
discusses global variation in people’s willingness to defer to elders, traditional authorities and ancient 
sages, and argues that these norms have shifted dramatically over the last millennium in some 
   
 
   
 
populations. Dovetailing with Henrich’s (2020) account, the philosopher Michael Strevens (2020) has 
argued that the success of modern science is built around its irrational focus on the use of empirical 
evidence to adjudicate theories in published discourse. While authority, elegance, intuition and other 
epistemic sources no doubt influence scientists themselves, epistemic norms bar them from deploying 
these sources in formal scientific communiques.  
By contrast, philosophers in many societies thought it made good sense to invoke ancient authorities or 
sages with “time-tested” wisdom to convince others. For example, the Confucian philosopher Xunzi, in 
arguing against the use of a person’s physical appearance to judge their personal characteristics or fate, 
starts by pointing out that physiognomy did not exist in antiquity and that learned scholars in ancient 
times did not talk about it (Knoblock, 1988). Notably, Xunzi did later invoke empirical arguments, but the 
precedence of and emphasis on authority is telling: the sentence “physiognomy did not exist in 
antiquity” is repeated three times in the first paragraph.2  
Nowadays, arguments from authority are often categorized as fallacious, even by textbooks on logic and 
critical thinking (Copi et al., 2018; Hansen, 2015; Rudinow, 2008; Walton & Koszowy, 2014). The average 
lay person in contemporary WEIRD societies, though not necessarily aware of the details of the scientific 
processes in specific disciplines, nonetheless has a vague understanding that some kind of empirical 
inquiry is needed to generate genuine knowledge (National Science Board, 2018). 
Of course, one of the central consequences of adaptive cultural evolution is that venerable traditions 
and stable customs are indeed often imbued with implicit knowledge and a kind of wisdom. As 
explained above, evolutionary approaches to culture argue that humans have evolved learning 
mechanisms that are often selective, guided by strategies and heuristics that dispose individuals to 
acquire some behaviors and ideas rather than others (Cheung et al., 2011; Evans et al., 2018; Heyes, 
2016; Koenig & Sabbagh, 2013; Laland, 2004). While these selective learning abilities can generate 
errors in isolated episodes of individual decision-making, both empirical and theoretical work reveal 
how they produce adaptive practices, strategies and heuristics over generations. Cultural evolution can 
generate an increasingly adaptive body of practices, customs, techniques and strategies without anyone 
really understanding the details of how or why these “work.” Consequently, traditions often embody an 
implicit wisdom (Boyd & Richerson, 2005) that the participants themselves don’t understand.  
Recent philosophical work has taken up these scientific lines of thought in at least two ways. First, 
philosophers have asked whether or not these kinds of selective social learning heuristics can be 
assimilated to traditional perspectives on rationality and epistemic virtue (Funkhouser, 2020; Levy & 
Alfano, 2020; Peters, 2020). Not surprisingly, humans seem to calibrate their learning heuristics in 
somewhat different ways in different places (Giuliano & Nunn, forthcoming; Mesoudi et al., 2014). 
Second, philosophers focused on institutions and moral progress have begun to consider the 
implications of this picture for politically conservative and progressive approaches to social change 
(Brownstein & Kelly, 2019; Buchanan & Powell, 2018; Kling, 2016) 
What counts as evidence? 
Would you consider a dream in which your teeth fell out as evidence that a close relative of yours is 
going to die? This is a common belief in Southwestern China. However, if you are from a WEIRD society, 
chances are that you would not—in fact, most Americans barely remember their dreams as they do not 
view dreams as providing relevant information for future events (Kracke, 1992). In stark contrast, both 
   
 
   
 
historical and anthropological evidence indicates that dreams have often been considered a valuable 
source of information that has been, and continues to be in some places, a guide to future decisions and 
actions (Bourguignon, 1972; Hollan, 1989; Lincoln, 2003; Tedlock, 1987). Even in societies with 
sophisticated literary and philosophical traditions, including both pre-modern China and ancient Greece, 
deciphering dreams for hidden information developed into the serious art of oneiromancy (Hong, 2021; 
Hughes, 2000). The Zhou dynasty (1046 BCE – 256 BCE), for example, had official positions for 
oneiromancers, and the historical record indicates that during the Han dynasty, when different 
divination methods didn’t yield the same result, oneiromancy took precedence (from the Han Shu, 
Yiwenzhi (Treatise on Literature)). 
Alongside dreams, the use of divination technologies has played a significant role in many, if not most, 
historically- and archeologically-known societies (Flad, 2008; Fodde-Reguer, 2014; Yi-long, 2020). 
Although many reading this article likely view divination as a silly superstition, many philosophers and 
other scholars across history—from ancient Greece and Egypt to Persia and China, have viewed it as a 
legitimate way of gaining knowledge (Annus, 2010) and the “signs” used in various divinatory practices 
were treated as genuine evidence for something that is going to happen. Today, among the Yi in 
southwest China, people use the burnt cracks on sheep shoulder blades as an indication for whether 
sacrificing particular animals would appease a malicious spirit and cure an illness. Some shamans even 
refer to the crack signs as zhengju 证据 (Mandarin), which translates exactly as “evidence” in English 
(Hong & Henrich, 2021). The great value that people place on divination is captured by their willingness 
to pay diviners substantial sums of money for their services.  
What’s WEIRD across human societies and back into history is not using dreams and divination as 
epistemic sources for important decisions. The use of dreams and divination technologies has frequently 
been endorsed by the elite and has been frequently used by Emperors and generals in statecraft and 
war. 
“Human” Judgment and Reasoning? 
Decades of research in cognitive science have suggested that “human reasoning” is systematically 
biased away from rational expectations in a variety of ways (Kahneman, 2011). However, rarely does the 
size or direction of these biases remain constant across societies, although this fact is rarely mentioned 
in popular accounts, textbooks or even journal publications. Let’s illustrate this with a bias that 
psychologists have dubbed the “Fundamental Attribution Error (Gilbert & Malone, 1995), which turns 
out not to be so fundamental.  
Consider this personal description of a motorcycle accident in India witnessed by a participant in a 
psychological study. 
This concerns a motorcycle accident. The back wheel burst on the motorcycle. The passenger sitting in the 
rear jumped. The moment the passenger fell, he struck his head on the pavement. The driver of the 
motorcycle—who is an attorney—as he was on his way to court for some work, just took the passenger to 
a local hospital and went on and attended to his court work. I personally feel the motorcycle driver did a 
wrong thing. The driver left the passenger there without consulting the doctor concerning the seriousness 
of the injury—the gravity of the situation—whether the passenger should be shifted immediately—and he 
went on to the court. So ultimately the passenger died. 
   
 
   
 
Why do you think the driver left the passenger at the hospital without staying to consult about the 
seriousness of the passenger's injury? One middle-class American explained, “The driver is obviously 
irresponsible; the driver was in a state of shock; the driver is aggressive in pursuing career success.” 
Now, contrast the American’s description with that of a middle-class Hindu participant in the city of 
Mysore, in southern India: “It was the driver's duty to be in court for the client whom he's representing; 
secondly, the driver might have gotten nervous or confused; and thirdly, the passenger might not have 
looked as serious as he was.” 
The Hindu participant focused on the lawyer’s roles and responsibilities, while considering situational 
factors that might explain his behavior. By contrast, the American focused more on the lawyer’s internal, 
dispositional states—he’s “irresponsible” and “aggressively” overambitious. By the Hindu’s account, the 
lawyer leaves the injured cyclist because of his responsibilities to his client—a relationship and 
responsibility. For the American, the lawyer departs out of concern that dillydallying might damage his 
professional advancement—his personal achievements. 
This story was part of an investigation by the psychologist Joan Miller (1984). Miller asked people in 
Chicago and Mysore to describe two situations in which someone they knew well did something that 
they (the participant) considered wrong. Participants were also asked to explain why it was wrong. 
Joan’s research team coded the contents of these narrations according to whether people used (a) 
contextual factors like social norms or relationships or (b) dispositional characteristics, such as 
references to personality traits, attributes (honesty) or competence. In both Mysore and Chicago, 
participants were middle-class adults as well as children and adolescents, ages 8, 11 and 15 years old.3 
Figure 3 shows the development of both contextual/relational and dispositional attributions for the 
situations described by people from both cities. In middle childhood, children in both cities are pretty 
similar, although the 8-year-old Chicago kids are already producing dispositional attributions about 15% 
of the time compared to 8% for their peers in Mysore. However, despite their similar starting points, the 
developmental trajectories for the two populations then diverge sharply. In Chicago, the frequency of 
dispositional attributions—like ‘dishonest’, ‘sincere’ or ’aggressive’—balloons to 45%. For the same 
developmental period, the frequency of contextual references remains relatively flat, going from 11% in 
the 8-year-olds to 14% in adults. Meanwhile, in Mysore, contextual attributions rise from 12% in 8-year 
olds to 32% in adults while dispositional attributions only increase from 8% to 15%. 
 
   
 




Figure 3. The development of dispositional versus contextual attributions for wrongdoing in Mysore (India) and 
Chicago (US). The black lines mark Chicago populations while grey indicates Mysore. The thicker lines indicate 
dispositional attributions while the thinner mark contextual attributions. These data were gleaned from Miller 
(1984). 
 
What’s going on? Is this some Indian peculiarity? No. It’s the people in Chicago who are peculiar when 
placed in a global and historical perspective. A wide range of other evidence, much of it collected since 
Miller’s early work, confirms that WEIRD people are particularly inclined toward dispositional inferences 
(Chiu et al., 2000; Heine, 2016; Nisbett, 2003; Smith & Apicella, 2020). The centrality of dispositions in 
the social sciences, using acontextual traits like ‘extroverted’, ‘inequality averse,’ or ‘moral’, reflect 
WEIRD biases in thinking.4   
Dispositional attributional biases are just the tip of an iceberg of cognitive variation in this domain. Most 
of the decision-making and judgment heuristics and biases heralded by psychologists and behavioral 
economists (Kahneman, 2011) vary across societies, with some disappearing entirely or even reversing 
direction. These include overconfidence (Yates et al., 1997, 1998), risk aversion (Vieider et al., 2015), the 
gambler’s fallacy (Ji et al., 2015), the hot hand fallacy, the representativeness heuristic (Spina, Ji, Tieyuan 
Guo, et al., 2010), neglecting regression to the mean (Spina, Ji, Ross, et al., 2010), functional fixity (Pope 
et al., 2018) and the endowment effect. Among WEIRD participants, for example, overconfidence biases 
in which participants overate their own abilities are robust, persistent and well-replicated. However, 
across both behavioral domains and diverse populations, researchers have found that population-level 
variation includes cases of underconfidence (Muthukrishna, Henrich, et al., 2018). Similarly, not only 






































   
 
   
 
2018), but some societies are risk prone (not risk averse) in absolute terms (Henrich & McElreath, 2002). 
Similarly, the famous endowment effect, in which participants place greater value on things they 
themselves own, does not appear in Tanzanian hunter-gatherers living their traditional lifestyle (Apicella 
et al., 2014) and is substantially muted among Japanese participants compared to Americans (Maddux 
et al., 2010). All of these patterns hold when real money or other goods are at stake and decisions 
impact people’s payoffs.  
In summary, faced with the identical information in relatively simple, incentivized problems, people 
from different societies deploy different heuristics and biases to arrive at different judgments and 
decisions. In fact, while many heuristics and biases have not been studied cross-culturally in any serious 
way, it is difficult to find examples that do not show important variation. 
WEIRD languages? 
A growing body of evidence suggests that language shapes our attention, habits of thought, 
categorizations, mental abilities and perceptions (Deutscher, 2010). Languages, of course, also provide 
us with a wide range of cognitive tools—e.g., concepts and categories—that influence how we parse the 
world and solve problems. Languages, for example, vary in how they reference direction and orient 
speakers and listeners in space. Some languages require speakers to track absolute directions—as in 
north, south, east and west—for all spatial references. Other languages provide multiple coordinate 
systems, including object-centered systems like ‘right’ and ‘left’, and relative coordinate systems that 
include the observer (“she’s on the left of the flagpole”). Growing up immersed in languages with 
different reference systems creates quite different cognitive demands, which cultivate impressive 
cognitive skills that are not easily mastered later in life by those who grew up elsewhere (Haun et al., 
2006; Levinson, 2003).  
Categories and concepts matter. Compared to agriculturalists living in the same environment, hunter-
gatherers possess a rich repertoire of ‘basic’ olfactory categories that allow them to abstractly describe 
and distinguish a wide range of scents (Majid & Kruspe, 2018). At the same time, it’s not uncommon for 
such small-scale societies to have between 0 and 3 basic color terms, and no explicit term or concept for 
‘color’ as a separate dimension (no easy way to say, ‘what color is it?’). If they do have 2 color terms, 
they are expansive versions of black and white. If they have a third, it’s usually an expansive red 
(Everett, 2005; Kay & Regier, 2003, 2006; Lindsey et al., 2015; Wierzbicka, 2013). Of course, while nearly 
all human populations perceive color variation (Sacks, 2012),5 the presence of terminological distinctions 
does impact performance in various cognitive tasks (Goldstein et al., 2009, 2009; Lucy, 1996). All this 
suggests that a hunter-gatherer philosopher would be unlikely to claim that scent was the least 
important of the senses—her language would likely have few or no abstract color terms but many 
abstract scent terms. 
Grammar shapes what we pay attention to because different grammars variously require speakers to 
track other people’s social status (e.g., choosing between formal and informal pronouns), gender (and 
how many genders?), time (e.g., mandatory future tense), number (e.g., ‘we’ involving 2, 3 or 4?), 
absolute direction and evidentiality (e.g., did you see it or just hear about it?). Like any daily training 
routine, such pervasive cognitive demands automate our attention and ingrain particular ways of 
processing information. At the same time, different vocabularies highlight particular concepts and 
provide ready ways of parsing and interpreting the world. While debates persist regarding the impact of 
language on thought, a growing body of evidence that stretches across several disciplines is revealing 
   
 
   
 
how certain features of language influence important domains of behavior. As unlikely as it may seem, 
economists have argued that languages with a mandatory future tense induce people to think about the 
future more, resulting in greater saving and investments for the future (Chen, 2021; Roberts et al., 
2015). Similarly, evidence suggests that gendered languages inhibit the participation of women in the 
labor force (Gay et al., 2018) and shape how people characterize non-animate referents (like furniture, 
celestial bodies or tools) (Williams et al. 2021). Meanwhile, cognitive scientists have long argued that 
languages influence how we think about time (Boroditsky, 2011, 2018) and agency (Fausey & Boroditsky, 
2010; Fausey & Boroditsky, 2010). Broadly, understanding how grammar shapes our attention and 
thinking would seem crucial to philosophical debates about language, policy and social change 
(Dembroff & Wodak, 2018).   
While some of the variation across languages might be a by-product of language-specific dynamics, 
there is evidence for extra-linguistic factors steering the evolution of languages (Henrich, 2016), 
including ecological conditions (Everett et al., 2015; Forker, 2020), religious taboos, social transmission 
(Blasi et al., 2017) and social structure (Foley, 1997; Lupyan & Dale, 2010). This further reinforces the 
association between the non-linguistic traits that characterize WEIRD societies with the linguistic 
properties of their languages (Galor & Sarid, 2018). 
Such evidence suggests that if scholars relied heavily on one language or perhaps a set of related 
languages, biases could arise in how they approach and analyze many kinds of questions, and even what 
questions they ask. Many concepts, like “morality” and “right and wrong” don’t have corresponding 
concepts in other languages (Wierzbicka, 2013). Of course, reliance on such concepts is especially 
worrisome if “research” involves probing and refining one’s own (native speaker) intuitions about such 
concepts (Stich & Mizumoto, Masaharu, forthcoming)—probe your intuitions about the importance of 
scents versus colors?   
Of course, research must be done in some language, so perhaps the languages used by philosophers and 
others are as representative as any other language? Well, it turns out that English is unusual among 
Germanic languages and Germanic languages are unusual among Indo-European languages (McWhorter, 
2008). Modern English has by far the largest vocabulary of any language, but a relatively simple 
grammatical morphology even compared to other European languages (Bentz et al. 2016; Henrich 
2016). For example, English grammar includes borrowed features, including elements from Celtic 
(probably) like the ‘meaningless do’ (Do you want to go to the store?). Illustrating its simplicity, English 
has grammaticalized distinctions only between simple and perfect past tense (watched/had watched), 
but in about 20% of the world’s languages past tense usage depends on the relative time interval 
between the utterance and the topic. For instance, in the Peruvian Amazon, Yagua has five such 
distinctions: the grammar distinguishes between events that have happened a few hours, one day, a few 
weeks, a few months, or in a distant past of the time in which the utterance is produced (Haan, 2010). 
The same holds for other domains such as spatial reference: while English uses a simple this-that 
distinction for overall proximity, many languages code for proximity in both the horizontal and vertical 
dimensions (Forker, 2020). For number, English differentiates singular from plural in the form of nouns 
while many other languages include dedicated forms for two, three or a few referents as well 
(Acquaviva, 2017). Finally, English has a relatively large number of phonemes and vowels as well as 
among the highest informational content per word of European languages (Muthukrishna & Henrich, 
2016). 
   
 
   
 
Of course, the lack of a grammaticalized distinction does not mean that English speakers are unable to 
craft more specific references. For example, nuanced temporal distinctions can be introduced through 
adverbs and adverbial phrases (“I worked until late yesterday”) and number can be conveyed through 
numerals (“They came across with three lions in their safari”). However, mounting evidence suggests 
the presence or absence of mandatory grammatical distinctions have observable cognitive and 
behavioral implications because they compel our attention (Almoammer et al., 2013; Thoma & Tytus, 
2018). 
Some have even argued that English may be among the least representative languages vis-à-vis the 
kinds of languages that our species has been using throughout our deep evolutionary history (J. Henrich, 
2016). For example, there’s both empirical and theoretical reasons to suspect that the sizes of speaker 
communities and the number of adult language learners will impact features like phoneme inventories, 
complex inflectional morphologies and vocabulary sizes (Atkinson, 2011; Hay & Bauer, 2007). English 
has, as noted, the largest community of speakers for any language in human history, with Mandarin in 
second place, trailing with several hundred million fewer speakers. By contrast, there’s little reason to 
suspect that ancestral languages had more than a few thousand speakers. Similarly, for a variety of 
reasons, the languages of small-scale societies tend to have few or no color terms, few numerals and, 
often, no explicit embedding tools (but used concatenation and context). Historical linguists have shown 
how embedding tools have evolved culturally over recent millennia and, more recently, have been 
shaped by literacy and schooling (Deutscher, 2005; Henrich, 2016). In the modern world, English 
speakers possess an unbounded counting system, a rich array of embedding tools and a package of 11 
basic color terms (but no basic scent terms). The age at which American children master their color 
terms has been declining over the last seventy years—going back as far as the data stretches. However, 
by contrast with most English speakers (urbanites), people in horticultural-foraging societies tend to 
possess richer olfactory and biological species taxonomies (Atran et al., 2004). Finally, ecological 
patterns suggest that the earliest human languages were tonal, which makes them distinct from all 
major European language (Everett et al., 2015). Thus, there are a variety of reasons to be particularly 
skeptical about the generalizability of any linguistic, psychological or philosophical intuitions rooted in 
English.  
Conclusion 
In the emerging interdisciplinary field of Cultural Evolution, a rising tide of theoretical and empirical 
work that has emerged over the last four decades makes a strong case that humans are a cultural 
species, that both our minds and bodies arose as products of the interaction between genes and culture 
over hundreds of thousands or even millions of years. Cultural evolutionists have argued that our 
capacities for cumulative cultural evolution, the hallmark of our species, produces many of the tools, 
techniques and heuristics that we think and reason with—ready examples include number systems, 
fractions, physical concepts (e.g., elastically stored energy and wheels) and perceptual categories 
(abstract color and scent terms). Social norms and daily demands mean that people habitualize the use 
of these in ways that recede into the background and become part of how we automatically perceive 
and process the world. Specifically, humans have evolved genetically to mold our minds and brains to 
culturally-constructed worlds—adapting to their diverse incentives, affordances, and constraints. In this 
paper, we provided an introductory review of work in this field, highlighting domains that might be of 
particular interest to philosophers. However, readers should bear in mind that this has been a selective 
   
 
   
 
review that represents only the tip of an empirical iceberg that continues to grow (Apicella et al., 2020; 
Heine, 2016; Henrich, 2020).  
Perhaps the most important development in this field has been the production and testing of theories to 
explain contemporary psychological variation and, methodologically, the integration of quantitative 
historical data into these analyses (Muthukrishna et al., 2021). For example, Schulz et. al. (2019) and 
Enke (2019) have linked a wide range of psychological outcomes, including analytic thinking, trust in 
strangers and individualism, to kin-based institutions—family organization. Talhelm et. al. (2020; 2014) 
have examined the role of paddy rice agriculture in explaining analytic thinking, interpersonal loyalty 
and self-concepts. Focusing on variation in gender inequality and other sex differences, economists have 
isolated the influence of large-animal pastoralism, plough-based agriculture and matrilineal kinship 
(Alesina et al., 2013; Becker, n.d.; Giuliano, 2018; Gneezy et al., 2009; Gong & Yang, 2012; Hoffman et 
al., 2011). By providing theories, rooted in historical processes, these approaches effectively address 
lingering concerns that the observed psychological variation developed recently or simply represents 
‘shallow’ responses to experimental protocols or interview questions. If these effects were shallow 
and/or ephemeral, how is it that we can explain important swaths of the variation with historical data 
from centuries past? 
While the evolutionary approach discussed here leaves ample room for innate or reliably developing 
features of human psychology, both the theory and evidence synthesized here undermine the view that 
many aspects of our minds are cognitive-impenetrable (Fodor, 1983). In the domain of perception alone, 
ample evidence indicates that cultural evolution has made us myopic (literally, they need glasses), 
reduced our underwater visual acuity (Gislen et al., 2003), decreased our sensitivity to odors, sharpened 
our color identification, altered our objective judgments of lines (Park et al., 2016), elevated our 
susceptibility to some visual illusions (Segall et al., 1966), and nearly eliminated lateral mirror invariance 
(seeing “b” and “d” as the same; J. Henrich, 2020). Culture has also shaped the heuristics and biases that 
influence our decision-making and manipulated our motivations and preferences related to everything 
from food, pain and sexual attraction to fairness, trust and cooperation with strangers (Ensminger & 
Henrich, 2014; J. Henrich, 2016). 
It’s now clear that much of what we find in social and developmental psychology textbooks is simply the 
“cultural psychology” of WEIRD people and represents a quantitative ethnographic description of how a 
particular population thinks, remembers, feels and reasons rather than a systematic study of human 
nature or our species’ evolved psychology. Philosophers, by confronting the WEIRD people problem and 
harnessing the tools found in Cultural Evolution, can avoid perpetuating a peculiar brand of “cultural 
philosophy,” rooted in WEIRD intuitions, and instead begin to construct a philosophy for Homo sapiens. 
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1 While the evidence showing variation in the strength of these illusions across populations remains largely 
unchallenged, researchers working with nine newly-sighted children have argued that the default, pre-experience, 
visual calibration in humans generates some detectable susceptibility to the Mueller-Lyer and Ponzo illusions 
(Gandhi et al., 2015). This may well be the case, but our point is that the perception of, and associated strength of 
some illusions, varies across populations—not that all illusions are produced only by experience. Nevertheless, this 
study is beleaguered by relying on a tiny sample, reporting only a crude measure of illusion susceptibility, and 
failing to explore how long these nearly blind children were sighted earlier in their lives.  
2 Of course, in Europe, we also observe that authority and tradition often implicitly or explicitly served as the 
justification for particular beliefs and practices. The claim that garlic can diminish the magnetic power of magnets, 
for example, was passed down over millennia primarily because great ancient Roman philosophers and naturalists 
wrote about it (Wootton, 2016). When it was eventually questioned in the 17th century, as modern experimental 
science was taking shape, we still see a strong epistemic reliance on authority: “…yet I cannot believe that so many 
 
   
 
   
 
 
famous Writers who have affirmed this perperty of the garlick, could be deceived; therefore I think that they had 
some other kinde of Load-stone, then that which we have now.” (Ross 1652). Here, in an attempt to preserve the 
veracity of ancient writers, Ross invokes the auxiliary hypothesis that it must have been a different kind of load 
stone that the ancients were referring to. By contrast, the political theorist Hannah Arendt (1951, 1961) points out 
that one defining characteristic of modernity is the loss of authority. Similarly, Strevens argues that since the 
scientific revolution in the 17th century, great emphasis has been placed on experience as the ultimate way to 
validate knowledge claims and as a result the appeal to other epistemic sources has declined (Wootton, 2016). 
3 Miller observed similar effects for prosocial situations, though dispositional attributions are generally less 
pronounced. See Heine (2012) for discussion. 
4 Interestingly, Miller did find that a Christian community of Indians in Mysore did make more dispositional 
attributions (30%) than either lower or middle-class members of the Hindu majority. In fact, they were about 
halfway between the Hindu majority and Chicago. Several researchers have argued that some forms of Christianity 
encourage dispositional thinking (Cohen & Rozin, 2001; Henrich, 2020; Li et al., 2012). 
5 Interestingly, there may be genetic variation that influences our ability to perceive specific regions of the color 
spectrum and this may impact the presence of color terms for ‘blue’ (Brown & Lindsey, 2004). 
